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Abstract
The principle of indifference (PI) states that in the absence of any relevant evidence, a rational
agent will distribute their credence (or ‘degrees of belief’) equally amongst all the possible outcomes
under consideration. Despite its intuitive plausibility, PI famously falls prey to paradox, and so is
widely rejected as a principle of ideal rationality. Some authors have attempted to show that by
conceiving of the epistemic states of agents in terms of imprecise credences, it is possible to overcome
these paradoxes and thus to achieve a consistent rehabilitation of PI. In this article, I present an
alternative rehabilitation of PI in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgements
of the form ‘I am more confident in the truth of p than I am in the truth q’ or ‘I am equally
confident in the truth of p and q’. In particular, I consider two natural comparative reformulations
of PI, and argue that while one of them prescribes the adoption of patently irrational epistemic
states, the other (which is only available when we drop the standard but controversial ‘Opinionation’
assumption from the comparative confidence framework) provides a consistent formulation of PI
that overcomes the fundamental limitations of all existing formulations.
1 Introduction
Bayesian epistemology is often characterised by the core constraints that (1) the epistemic states
of rational agents should be conceived of in terms of precisely quantified numerical ‘degrees of
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belief’ or ‘credences’, (2) a rational agent’s credences should always be probabilistic, and (3)
upon learning new evidence, rational agents should update their credences by means of Bayesian
conditionalisation.1 But these norms alone are not sufficient to define a universally applicable
epistemic strategy for rational agents. Most pertinently, (1) (2) and (3) tell us nothing about what
initial credences agents should adopt at the very beginning of their credal lives, before they obtain
any relevant evidence about the world.2 The best known solution to this problem is given by the
principle of indifference,
Principle of Indifference (PI): Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be a partition of the set W of
possible worlds into n mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities. In the absence of any
relevant evidence pertaining to which cell of the partition is the true one, a rational agent should
assign an equal initial credence of 1n to each cell.
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Armed with PI, the Bayesian now has access to a complete recipe for rationality that instructs
agents not only on how to revise their credences in the face of new evidence, but also on what
credences they should adopt in the absence of all evidence. And of course, PI is an extremely
intuitive and plausible principle with a number of independent justifications.4
Sadly though, it turns out that PI leads immediately to paradox once one attempts to apply it
across multiple partitions of possibility space at the same time. To illustrate, consider the following
example (due to van Fraassen, 1989). A hypothetical factory manufactures qualitatively identical
cubes. The only information you are given is that the length of a side of any cube is at most 2
1i.e. upon learning evidence E, an agent should assign any proposition X a posterior degree of belief P (X|E) = P (X∧E)P (E) .
2Other than that those credences should be probabilistic.
3For simplicity, I restrict my analysis to the finite case throughout the article. Since the paradoxes in question already
arise in the finite setting, I take this to be an admissible simplification for present purposes.
4PI has been justified, for example, by considerations concerning epistemic utility (Pettigrew, 2014), risk aversion
(Williamson, 2007), evidential support (White, 2009), informativity (Jaynes, 1957), and the Principal Principle (Hawthorne
et al, 2015).
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feet. This implies that the length of a side is either between 0 and 1 (L0,1), or between 1 and 2
(L1,2). These possibilities define a partition X1 = {L0,1, L1,2}, and PI requires you to distribute
your credence equally across its cells. Specifically, your prior probabilistic credal state Pr should
satisfy the equality Pr(L0,1) = 1/2 = Pr(L1,2).
But instead of asking about the length of a side, you could equally well ask about the area
of a side. The fact that the length of any side is at most 2 feet entails that the area of any
side is at most 4 square feet. So we can partition the possibility space into the four possibilities:
X2 = {A0,1, A1,2, A2,3, A3,4}. Again, the evidence gives you no reason to prefer any one of these
possibilities to any other, so PI requires you to assign them all equal prior probability, Pr(A0,1) =
Pr(A1,2) = Pr(A2,3) = Pr(A3,4) = 1/4.
Now note that the sentences L0,1 and A0,1 are logically equivalent. But PI has required us to
assign them different probabilities (1/2 and 1/4, respectively). Following PI, we’ve assigned two
contradictory credences to a single proposition.
This paradox, of which there are many versions, has puzzled philosophers for roughly a century.
One popular prospective solution (advocated by Keynes (1921) and Kass and Wasserman (1996),
amongst others) has been to argue that there are certain ‘privileged’ partitions over which rational
agents should apply PI. For example, it might be argued that in the cube example, you should only
apply PI to the finer partition X2, and then derive your credences over X1 from the distribution
over X2. However, the details of such a resolution have remained problematic, and the philosophical
foundations of this approach have been extensively critiqued in the literature (see e.g. Von Mises
(1951), Norton (2008), Shackel (2007)). Here, I will assume that any satisfactory rehabilitation of
PI will require rational agents to treat all possible partitions of possibility space equally, i.e. it will
legislate that they should adopt the same kinds of epistemic attitudes across all partitions for which
they lack any relevant evidence.
Another influential approach to resolving the paradox is to abandon the idea that the epistemic
states of rational agents should always be conceived of in terms of precise numerical credences.
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Authors including Joyce (2005, 2010), Weatherson (2007), Kaplan (1996), Walley (1991) and Dupin
(2015) have argued that PI can be consistently reformulated in a philosophically satisfactory manner
once we allow for the possibility that rational agents sometimes have imprecise credences. Although
the details of these approaches vary significantly between authors, the general idea is that an agent
without access to any evidence regarding which cell of a partition is the true one should assign every
cell maximally imprecise credence. This preserves the basic idea that indifferent agents should treat
every cell of the partition equally, but it avoids paradox by rejecting the assumption that this equal
treatment should be represented by an assignment of equal point valued credences.
But despite their popularity, these imprecise reformulations of PI are also plagued with fun-
damental technical and philosophical problems. In a recent series of articles, Rinard (2013, 2014)
shows that most extant variations of the imprecise approach to PI (i) end up requiring agents to be
indifferent between propositions about which they clearly should not be indifferent, and (ii) typically
render meaningful inductive learning impossible.5 She also shows that the most natural response
to these problems (to prescribe non-maximally imprecise credences) is unable to help, since it leads
to probabilistic incoherence. Although my aim here is not to present an evaluation of imprecise
reformulations of PI, I take it that these results cast enough doubt on the imprecise approach to
motivate the search for an alternative solution to the paradoxes of indifference.
Like the proponents of the imprecise reformulation of PI, I will attempt to resolve the paradoxes
of indifference by rejecting the Bayesian assumption that epistemic states should always be conceived
of in terms of precise numerical credences. But rather than replacing precise numerical credences
with imprecise interval valued credences, I will work within the framework of comparative confidence
judgements. Specifically, I will assume that an agent’s epistemic state is characterised by judgements
of the form ‘I am more confident in the truth of p than I am in the truth of q’ or ‘I am equally
confident in the truth of p and q’. Numerous eminent figures from the history of probability such
as Keynes (1921), de Finetti (1937, 1951), Koopman (1940) and Fine (1973) have argued that
5This limitation was already noted by e.g. Joyce (2010).
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comparative confidence judgements are the most fundamental, intuitive and psychologically basic
of all our epistemic attitudes, so I am in good company when I assume that a rational agent’s
epistemic state can at least some times be fully characterised in comparative terms.
Furthermore, by studying possible reformulations of PI in terms of comparative confidence
judgements, we can hope to gain a new perspective on the scope and tenacity of the paradoxes
of indifference. For, comparative confidence judgements are far more coarse grained and generally
applicable epistemic attitudes than precise assignments of numerical credence. If it turned out
that the paradoxes of indifference still arose for agents whose epistemic states are characterised
entirely by comparative confidence judgements, then the problem would be far more severe than
has hitherto been recognised. Conversely, if we are able to obtain a philosophically satisfactory
comparative reformulation of PI, that would help us to diagnose the root cause of the paradoxes of
indifference, and could also be viewed as prima facie evidence for the claim that the norms of ideal
rationality should sometimes be articulated as constraints on comparative confidence judgements.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I present a concise overview of some of the
most important technical assumptions and synchronic rationality constraints from the literature
on comparative confidence judgements. In section 3 I consider the most obvious reformulation of
PI in terms of comparative confidence judgements and demonstrate that, despite being consistent,
it provides agents with intuitively irrational advice. In section 4 I show how one can obtain an
alternative comparative formulation of PI by dropping the controversial Opinionation assumption
for comparative confidence orderings, and argue that the resulting formulation provides consistent,
philosophically principled and intuitively rational epistemic guidance to agents. In section 5 I
show how agents that organise their initial epistemic states in line with my preferred comparative
reformulation of PI can undergo genuine inductive learning as they acquire new evidence. Section
6 concludes.
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2 Comparative Confidence Orders
Let’s begin with some formal preliminaries. Firstly, I assume that agents make comparative con-
fidence judgements about ‘propositions’ drawn from some fixed Boolean algebra B of equivalence
classes of logically equivalent sentences of a fixed language L. An agent A can make two kinds of
comparative confidence judgement about propositions in B. They can be strictly more confident
in the truth of p than they are in the truth of q. I denote this kind of judgement with the notation
[p  q]. Alternatively, A can be equally confident in the truth of p and q. I denote this second
kind of judgement with the notation [p ∼ q]. The set of all A’s comparative confidence judgements
defines a confidence ordering, %, over some subset of the propositions in B, defined by p  q if and
only if [p  q], and p ∼ q if and only [p ∼ q]. I write p % q to indicate the disjunction ‘p  q or
p ∼ q’. Most authors make the following basic assumption about %.
Opinionation: For any p, q ∈ B, A makes exactly one of the judgements [p  q], [q  p], [p ∼ q],
i.e. one of p  q, q  p and p ∼ q is true.
Opinionation implies that % is a ‘total ordering’ of B. Intuitively, it means that there are ‘no
gaps’ in A’s confidence judgements, i.e. A makes a comparative confidence judgement about every
pair of propositions inB. This assumption, though controversial, is standard in the extant literature
on comparative confidence orderings. It will play a crucial role in assessing prospective comparative
reformulations of PI. It is also typically assumed that  satisfies the following conditions.
Irreflexivity of : For every p ∈ B, A does not make the judgement [p  p], i.e. p  p.
Transivity of : For every p, q, r ∈ B, if A makes the judgements [p  q] and [q  r], then A
makes the judgement [p  r], i.e. if p  q and q  r, then p  r.
Finally, it is standard to assume that ∼ is an equivalence relation, i.e.
Reflexivity of ∼: For every p ∈ B, A makes the judgement [p ∼ p], i.e. p ∼ p.
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Transivity of ∼: For every p, q, r ∈ B, if A makes the judgements [p ∼ q] and [q ∼ r], then A
makes the judgement [p ∼ r], i.e. if p ∼ q and q ∼ r, then p ∼ r.
Symmetry of ∼: For every p, q ∈ B, if A makes the judgements [p ∼ q], then A makes the
judgement [q ∼ p], i.e. if p ∼ q, then q ∼ p.
When all of these assumptions are satisfied, the ordering % is called a ‘total preorder’ over B.
In the literature, it is almost universally assumed that the comparative confidence judgements of
rational agents will always define a total preorder over B. However, there is still relatively little
consensus regarding which additional properties are characteristic of rationally permissible confi-
dence orderings. The most important additional constraints are normally phrased in terms of the
representability of % by numerical functions. Given a comparative confidence ordering % over B
and a function µ : B→ [0, 1], say that % is ‘fully represnted’ by µ if and only if for every p, q ∈ B,
(i) p  q ⇔ µ(p) > µ(q), and (ii) p ∼ q ⇔ µ(p) = µ(q). Icard (2016) gives a pragmatic ‘money-
pump’ style argument in favour of the requirement that % should always be fully representable by
a probability function, while Fitelson and Mccarthy (forthcoming) provide an epistemic utility the-
oretic justification for the requirement that % should always be fully representable by a Dempster
Schafer belief function (they also show that no such justification can be given for the probabilistic
representability requirement). Here, I remain agnostic about which (if any) of these representability
conditions we should accept, and assume only the following almost universally accepted monotonic-
ity conditions.
(A1) >  ⊥.
(A2) For any p, q ∈ B, if p ` q then q % p.
A1 requires that rational agents always be strictly more confident in the tautology than they are
in the contradiction, and A2 is a general monotonicity requirement, which stipulates that agents
should never be strictly more confident in p than they are in the logical consequences of p. As well
as being intuitively compelling, these rationality constraints have been given a range of pragmatic
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justifications (see e.g. Fishburn (1986), Halpern (2003)). Here, we will assume only that rational
agents always have comparative confidence orderings that (i) define total preorders over B, and (ii)
satisfy A1 and A2. We are now ready to translate PI to this very general setting.
3 Comparative Indifference: Take 1
We’ve seen that the standard probabilistic version of PI leads straight to paradox when we attempt
to apply it simultaneously across multiple partitions of possibility space. But now suppose that we
are trying to advise a rational agent whose epistemic state is characterised purely by a comparative
confidence ordering of the type described in the previous section. What comparative confidence
judgements should such an agent make when they do not have access to any relevant evidence
regarding the possibilities under consideration? The most natural suggestion is the following,
which is a direct translation of PI to the comparative setting.
Comparative Principle of Indifference 1 (CPI1): Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be a partition
of the set W of possible worlds into n mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities. In
the absence of any relevant evidence pertaining to which cell of the partition is the true one, a
rational agent should make the comparative confidence judgements [xi ∼ xj ], for all i, j ≤ n.
Clearly, CPI1 appears to capture the essential philosophical intuition behind PI, i.e. that you
shouldn’t prefer one outcome to another unless you have evidence telling you to do so. It prescribes
that a rational agent without access to any evidence pertaining to which cell of the partition is the
true one should be equally confident in every cell.
The fact that a comparative reformulation like CPI1 provides perfectly consistent guidance to
rational agents was first noted by Norton (2008, 2010).6 To illustrate, recall again van Fraassen’s
6Norton actually doesn’t formalise the principle in terms of comparative confidence judgements, but rather in terms
of ‘degrees of inductive support’, which are not assumed to be probabilsitic. It is easy to see that the reformulation used
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cube example. In this case there are two relevant partitions over which the agent should apply CPI1.
These are X1 = {L0,1, L1,2} (the partition in terms of length) and X2 = {A0,1, A1,2, A2,3, A3,4} (the
partition in terms of area). CPI1 recommends that the indifferent agent should be equally confident
in the two hypotheses regarding length and equally confident in the four hypotheses regarding area.
But since A0,1 and L0,1 are logically equivalent, this immediately implies (using the fact that ∼ is an
equivalence relation) that the agent is equally confident in all of the propositions being considered,
i.e. their ordering satisfies the following relations:
L0,1 ∼ L1,2 ∼ A0,1 ∼ A1,2 ∼ A2,3 ∼ A3,4
There is no ambiguity or inconsistency in the epistemic advice given by CPI1. The principle
tells the agent exactly which epistemic attitudes to adopt, and at first blush, these attitudes look
plausible. So one might think that the paradox of indifference simply vanishes in the comparative
setting. As Norton puts it,
[I]f we forgo the idea that belief states must be probability distributions, then there is
a unique, well defined, ignorance state. It assigns the same, unique, ignorance degree of
belief to every contingent outcome and each of their contingent disjunctive parts in the
outcome space. (Norton, 2008: 46)
However, I contend that something has gone seriously wrong in the comparative reformulation
of PI described above. To see this, note first that the sentence L1,2 is logically equivalent to the
disjunction A1,2 ∨ A2,3 ∨ A3,4.7 And CPI1 has recommended that rational agents without any
evidence regarding the area of the sides of the cube should make the judgement L1,2 ∼ A1,2, i.e.
A1,2 ∼ (A1,2 ∨A2,3 ∨A3,4)
Informally, this means that CPI1 is advising the agent to be equally confident in the claims ‘the
area of a side of the cube is between 1 and 2 square feet’ and ‘the area of a side of the cube is
here is formally equivalent to Norton’s version of PI.
7A square has area between 1 and 4 square feet if and only if it’s sides have length between 1 and 2 feet.
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between 1 and 4 square feet’ when they have no absolute no relevant evidence to go on. But this
seems deeply irrational. To make this intuitive irrationality precise, consider the following plausible
principle for connecting comparative confidence judgements to betting behaviour.
Indifferent Betting Principle (IBP): Given two proposition p and q, and two gambles of the
form
Gamble 1: ogood if p is true, and obad if p is false
Gamble 2: ogood if q is true, and obad if q is false
if a rational agent A makes the judgement p ∼ q, then they should not be willing to pay any
positive price to exchange gamble 1 for gamble 2 (or vice-versa).
I won’t do much here to defend IBP, which I take to be a prima-facie compelling principle.8
Intuitively, it simply says that if you are equally confident in p and q, then you shouldn’t pay
anything to exchange a gamble on p for a gamble on q with the same possible payoffs, which strikes
me as an obvious and fundamental edict of practical rationality.
Now, imagine that we tell an agent about the cube factory and offer them the choice between
the following two options:
(1) Take the following gamble for free:
Gamble 1: Win $1, 000, 000 if the area of a side is between 1 and 2 square feet, and win $0
otherwise.
(2) Pay any positive price α > 0 to buy the following gamble:
Gamble 2: Win $1, 000, 000 if the area of a side is between 1 and 4 square feet, and win $0
otherwise.
8A structurally similar assumption regarding the relationship between comparative confidence judgements and betting
behaviour is made by Icard (2016). Note that if the comparative confidence ordering is derived from an agent’s probabilistic
credences, then IBP is a logical consequence of maximising expected utility.
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Next, suppose that the agent follows the advice given by CPI1 and conforms to the betting
principle IBP. Then they will always take option (1). Intuitively, this is deeply irrational. The
agent is not willing to pay any price, however small in order to greatly increase the size of the
region of evidentially possible worlds in which they would win $1, 000, 000, in spite of the fact that
they have absolutely no evidence that speaks against the plausibility of the worlds that lie in the
region they’re neglecting. If that’s what the principle of indifference recommends, then it should
be rejected as a principle of ideal rationality.
It should be noted that Norton (2008) actually imposes the condition that indifferent agents
should be equally confident in the propositions ‘the area is between 1 and 2 square feet’ and ‘the
area is between 1 and 4 square feet’ as a desideratum for any prospective formulation of epistemic
indifference,9 and takes the fact that the comparative reformulation CPI1 satisfies this desideratum
to count in its favour. The preceding analysis demonstrates, contra Norton, that any formulation of
PI that has this property should be rejected on the grounds that it prescribes manifestly irrational
epistemic attitudes.
We’ve seen that the comparative reformulation of PI given by CPI1, unlike its probabilistic
counterpart, gives definite and consistent advice when applied simultaneously across multiple dif-
ferent partitions of possibility space. However, we’ve also seen that despite being consistent, this
advice is bad. Given a very weak and intuitively compelling principle linking comparative confi-
dence judgements to betting behaviour, an agent that adheres to CPI1 will behave in strange and
patently irrational ways.
9This is entailed by his requirement that indifference should be ‘invariant across disjunctive coarsenings of the outcome
space’.
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4 Comparative Indifference: Take 2
Happily, there is another way to capture the basic philosophical intuition behind PI in a compar-
ative setting. To see this, let’s turn our attention briefly to the Opinionation assumption that I
presented at the beginning of Section 2. According to this assumption, for any two propositions p
and q, a rational agent should always either (i) be more confident in p than they are in q, (ii) be
equally confident in p and q, or (iii) be more confident in q than they are in p. Of course, if an
agent’s comparative confidence judgements are derived from an assignment of precise probabilistic
credences, then their confidence ordering will always satisfy Opinionation. But recall that we are
working in a generalised setting in which it is not assumed that agents have well defined credences.
We are assuming that it is possible for the content of a rational agent’s epistemic state to be ex-
hausted by their comparative confidence judgements. Once we make this assumption, it is not clear
why we should assume that rationally permissible confidence orderings always satisfy Opinionation.
Indeed, dissatisfaction with the Opinionation assumption has been expressed by many influential
authors. Thus, we read, for example (my emphases)
It seems to me that at present it is not yet clear whether the concept of degree of confir-
mation can be defined satisfactorily as a quantitative concept... Perhaps it is preferable
to define it as a merely topological concept, i.e. by defining only the relations: ‘S1 has
the same or a higher degree of confirmation than S2, respectively’ but in such a way that
most of the pairs of sentences will be incomparable. (Carnap 1936: 427)
I maintain...that there are some pairs of probabilities between the members of which no
comparison of magnitude is possible. (Keynes 1921: 36)
The implausibility of Opinionation as a general principle of ideal rationality is often cited as
a motivation for the replacement of standard Bayesianism with its imprecise counterpart (see e.g.
Kaplan, 1996). Here, I won’t go into details regarding the usual reasons for rejecting Opinionation
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(see e.g. Keynes 1921, Forrest 1989 for characteristic discussions). Rather, I will show that, by
dropping the Opinionation assumption, we put ourselves in a position to obtain an alternative
comparative reformulation of PI that, unlike its predecessor, does not give systematically bad advice.
I take this to constitute a strong argument in favour of rejecting Opinionation, in addition to those
that already exist in the literature.
To make things concrete, we need to slightly amend the formal framework described in section
2. Recall that the collection of an agent’s comparative confidence judgements define a confidence
ordering % over the algebra B of possible outcomes. Until now we’ve assumed that % is a total
preorder on B. By dropping only the Opinionation assumption, we allow for the possibility that %
can be a partial preorder over B. This means that there can be p, q ∈ B such that neither p % q nor
q % p are true in the ordering. In such a case, we write pq and say that p and q are ‘incomparable’
in the ordering. Conceptually, it is important to note that incomparability is not another kind of
comparative confidence judgement, but rather the absence of any comparative confidence judgement
whatsoever. If p and q are incomparable in an agent’s confidence ordering, then the agent has
simply refrained from making any judgement regarding their comparative plausibility. It is also
important to note that dropping Opinionation does nothing to ‘infect’ the other basic assumption
we made about the structure of the ordering. It is still very plausible to assume that the ‘strictly
more confident than’ is transitive and a-symmetric, that the ‘equally confident in’ relation is an
equivalence relation, and that rational agents (i) should be strictly more confident in the tautology
than they are in the contradiction, and (ii) should always be at least as confident in the logical
consequences of p as they are in p. Since we’ve simply defined incomparability as the complement
of all other possible ordering relations, it trivially follows that  is symmetric, irreflexive and
typically non-transitive.
It is also important to ask whether there are any additional synchronic rationality constraints
that should be imposed on comparative confidence orderings in the absence of the Opinionation
assumption. This question has not yet been systematically explored in the philosophical literature
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(although see Forrest (1989) for an illuminating discussion). One formal condition has been ten-
tatively forwarded in the technical literature (see e.g. Harrison-Tailor et al (2016), Forrest (1989),
Alon and Lehrer (2014)) is the following:
(A3) there should exist a non-empty set P of additive probability measures on B such that for
any p, q ∈ B:
p % q ⇔ (∀P ∈ P)(P (p) ≥ P (q))
p q ⇔ (∃P, P ′ ∈ P)(P (p) > P (q)) ∧ (P ′(p) < P (q))
When % satisfies A3, I say that it is ‘fully represented’ by any set P that makes A3 true. It is
important to note that assuming A3 is certainly not equivalent to assuming that an agent’s epistemic
state is characterised by any particular set of probability functions (a la Joyce (2005, 2010) and
Weatherson (2007)). Generally, if a confidence ordering satisfies A3, there will be infinitely many
different sets of probability functions that could be used to represent it, and no particular set has
any special claim to representing the agent’s epistemic state.
At any rate, A3 is a much stronger condition than is needed for present purposes. In what
follows, I assume only the extremely weak and plausible condition
(A4) If p % q then ¬q % ¬p
A4 requires only that if I’m at least as confident in the truth of p as I am in the truth of q, then I
should be at least as confident in the falsity of q as I am in the falsity of p. Again, I won’t say much
to motivate this condition, which I take to be a prima-facie compelling principle of ideal rationality.
However, it is worth noting that in the Opinionated setting, A4 is implied by both probabilistic
representability and Dempster-Schafer belief function representability, and in the non-Opinionated
setting, it is implied by A3. In what follows, I will mainly use examples of orderings that satisfy A3,
since seeing the orderings represented by sets of probability distributions is likely to aid the reader’s
intuitive understanding. But I stress that this is not indicative of any substantive philosophical
commitments on my part. A4 is the only substantive synchronic rationality constraint that plays
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a role in the subsequent analysis, and it does not require that the confidence orderings of rational
agents be representable by sets of probability distributions.
We are now ready to see how this generalised comparative framework allows us to obtain
another plausible comparative reformulation of PI.
Comparative Principle of Indifference 2 (CPI2): Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be a partition
of the set W of possible worlds into n mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities. In
the absence of any relevant evidence pertaining to which cell of the partition is the true one, a
rational agent should not make any comparative confidence judgements regarding the pairs (xi, xj)
for i, j ≤ n. Equivalently, for all i, j ≤ n, xi  xj should hold in the agent’s confidence ordering.
Like CPI1, CPI2 captures the basic intuition that an agent without access to any relevant
evidence should treat every cell of the partition equally. In particular, they should not regard any
cell as more plausible than any other. More than that, they should simply refrain from making
any comparative confidence judgements whatsoever regarding the cells of the partition. Intuitively,
CPI2 tells agents not to make any comparative confidence judgments (including judgements of equal
plausibility) until they encounter evidence supporting those judgements.
However, unlike CPI1, CPI2 does not force an agent to adopt the kind of radically non-additive
and patently irrational epistemic states prescribed by CPI1. To illustrate, consider again van
Fraassen’s cube example. CPI2 requires that the indifferent agent should refrain from making
any comparative confidence judgements regarding the cells in the partitions X1 = {L0,1, L1,2} and
X2 = {A0,1, A1,2, A2,3, A3,4}, respectively. This amounts to requiring that their confidence ordering
should satisfy the relations
(i) L0,1  L1,2
(ii) A0,1 A1,2, A0,1 A2,3, A0,1 A3,4, A1,2 A2,3, A1,2 A3,4, A2,3 A3,4
Note that (i) and (ii) do not imply that A1,2  L1,2 even though we have L1,2  L0,1  A1,2.
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For, unlike the ‘equally confident’ relation (∼), the incomparability relation () is typically not
transitive. This is crucial, since just as I argued that it would be deeply implausible for an agent
to be equally confident in the propositions ‘the area is between 1 and 2’ and ‘the area is between
1 and 4’, it would seem to be equally implausible for an agent to simply refrain from making any
comparative confidence judgement about those propositions. Surely a rational agent should be
more confident in the latter proposition than they are in the former, for the reasons described
in the previous section. It’s easy to see that this requirement is perfectly consistent with CPI2.
For example, consider the ordering % that corresponds (in the sense defined by A3) to the set of
probability distributions P = {P1, P2, P3, P4}, where
P1(A0,1) = 0.7, P1(A1,2) = 0.1, P1(A2,3) = 0.1, P1(A3,4) = 0.1,
P2(A0,1) = 0.1, P2(A1,2) = 0.7, P2(A2,3) = 0.1, P2(A3,4) = 0.1,
P3(A0,1) = 0.1, P3(A1,2) = 0.1, P3(A2,3) = 0.7, P3(A3,4) = 0.1,
P4(A0,1) = 0.1, P4(A1,2) = 0.1, P4(A2,3) = 0.1, P4(A3,4) = 0.7
It is easy to see that so defined, P defines the confidence ordering % depicted below.
>
¬A3,4 ¬A2,3 ¬A1,2 ¬A0,1
A0,2 A0,1 ∨A2,3 A0,1 ∨A3,4 A1,3 A1,2 ∨A3,4 A2,4
A0,1 A1,2 A2,3 A3,4
⊥
The first thing to note here is that this ordering straightforwardly satisfies CPI2 for the cube
example. None of the propositions in the area partition X2 = {A0,1, A1,2, A2,3, A3,4} is comparable
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to any other, as CPI2 demands, and similarly for the length partition X1 = {A0,1,¬A0,1} (where
A0,1 and ¬A0,1 are equivalent to L0,1 and L1,2, respectively). Furthermore, the ordering ranks the
proposition A1,4 strictly above A1,2, A2,3 and A3,4, which is exactly the desirable property that
was violated when we followed the advice of CPI1. Agents can follow the advice of CPI2 while
making the common sense judgement that the proposition ‘the area is between 1 and 4 square feet’
is strictly more plausible than the proposition ‘the area is between 1 and 2 square feet’. So as well
as giving us consistent advice, it seems that CPI2 also gives us epistemically reasonable advice,
unlike its predecessor, CPI1.
At this stage, the reader might notice that the confidence ordering depicted above has a
familiar structure. Specifically, it has the structure of the 16 Boolean algebra that depicts the
classical logical structure of a language with four mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
atomic propositions.10 Thus, we have an example of a confidence ordering that (i) satisfies
CPI2, (ii) is fully representable by a set of probability functions, and therefore satisfies A4, (iii)
doesn’t encode any patently irrational comparative confidence judgements, and (iv) is actually
isomorphic to the logical structure of the language being used to describe the possibility space.
In fact, it turns out that this is an instance of a general phenomena, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem: Let B be the Boolean algebra encoding the logical structure of a language L. If
an agent does not have access to any evidence pertaining to any non-trivial partitions of B, then
the only way for them to satisfy both CPI2 and A4 is for their confidence ordering over B to be
isomorphic to B itself.11
Proof: It follows immediately from its definition that B is always a partial pre-order over its
own underlying set of propositions that satisfies A1, A2 and A4. To show that B satisfies CPI2, let
{p1, ...., pn} be a partition of B. By definition, none of the pi’s entail one another (they’re mutually
10Standardly referred to as the ‘Lindenbaum algebra’ of the language.
11By a ‘non-trivial partition’, I mean a partition that consists only of contingent propositions.
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exclusive), so they are all incomparable in B’s ordering, as desired.
Conversely, let % be an partial pre-order over B’s underlying set that satisfies A1, A2, A4 and
CPI2. In order to show that % is isomorphic to B, it suffices to show that q % p if and only if
p ` q. By A2, p ` q implies q % p. Next, suppose for contradiction that q % p and p 0 q. Since
p 0 q, p ∧ ¬q is a contingent possibility and {p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q,¬p} is a non-trivial partition. Since %
satisfies CPI2, it follows that (p ∧ ¬q) ¬p. Furthermore, since % satisfies A4 and q % p, we have
¬p % ¬q % (p ∧ ¬q), contradicting (p ∧ ¬q) ¬p. 
This theorem shows that, combined with the very weak synchronic rationality constraint A4,
CPI2 always prescribes a unique confidence ordering for agents at the very beginning of their credal
lives, namely the ordering that simply encodes the deductive relationships between the propositions
in the relevant language. This strengthens the argument for the superiority of CPI2 as compared
to CPI1. Whereas CPI1 entails that agents in the cube example should always be equally confident
in the propositions ‘The area is between 1 and 2 square feet’ and ‘The area is between 1 and 4
square feet’, CPI2 (combined with A4) entails that agents should always be strictly more confident
in the latter than they are in former. It is not just that CPI2 permits agents to make such obviously
rational judgements. It requires them to do so.
5 How to Raise a Superbaby
In the previous section, I argued that CPI2 is the best available comparative reformulation of PI.
However, one might be worried that the prospects of embedding CPI2 in a plausible and non-trivial
inductive logic are dim. Specifically, it’s unclear how an agent whose initial epistemic state is
characterised by a partial preorder over B should revise their epistemic attitudes as they gain new
evidence about the world. Here, I show that there is actually a very natural and straightforward
way to embed CPI2 in a general inductive logic that generalises Bayesian conditionalisation to the
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comparative setting.
To begin, consider the question ‘how should an agent revise their comparative confidence judge-
ments over time as they gather new evidence about the world?’. More precisely, suppose that an
agent begins with a confidence ordering % and subsequently learns some evidential proposition e
with certainty. They then need to adopt a new ordering that satisfies the relation e ∼ > (reflect-
ing their new found certainty in e) and takes into account all the evidential ramifications of their
learning experience. How should they do this? One natural option is to take a cue from Bayesian
conditionalisation, i.e. to study how Bayesian agents revise their comparative confidence judge-
ments when they conditionalise on e. Given a probability distribution P , let %P be the confidence
ordering defined by q P p if and only if P (q) > P (p) and p ∼P q if and only if P (p) = P (q). By
definition, P fully represents %P , and we can think of %P as encoding the comparative confidence
judgements of a Bayesian agent whose credal state is given by the probability function P . Now,
we can ask ‘what is the relationship between %P and %P (−|e)?’, where P (−|e) is the probability
function obtained by conditionalising P on e. This question has a simple answer:
q P (−|e) p⇔ P (q|e) > P (p|e)
⇔ P (q|e)p(e) > P (p|e)p(e)
⇔ P (e ∧ q) > P (e ∧ p)
⇔ e ∧ q P e ∧ p
Thus, if we let %e denote the ordering that results from revising the initial ordering % after
learning e, a Bayesian agent will always revise their confidence orderings according to the rule
(CC:) q e p⇔ e ∧ q  e ∧ p, and q ∼e p⇔ e ∧ q ∼ e ∧ p
Where ‘CC’ stands for ‘comparative conditionalisation’. In a companion paper (REDACTED),
I consider the question of whether there is anything normatively special about CC from the perspec-
tive of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgements. It turns out that in contexts where
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Opinionation is assumed, CC can be justified both in terms of expected accuracy minimisation
(utilising Fitelson and Mccarthy’s (forthcoming) epistemic utility theoretic framework for compar-
ative confidence orderings), and also in terms of a norm of epistemic conservativity. Of course, one
of the central contentions of this article is that the Opinionation assumption is incompatible with a
proper treatment of indifference, so we need to generalise the definition of CC, in which case these
normative justifications may no longer apply. The obvious generalisation is the following.
(CC*:) q e p⇔ e ∧ q  e ∧ p, q ∼e p⇔ e ∧ q ∼ e ∧ p and q e p⇔ e ∧ q  e ∧ p
The problem of providing normative justifications for this generalisation of CC to the non-
opinionated setting is an important one that I leave aside for now. For present purposes, I am
happy to simply posit CC* as the natural generalisation of a revision rule with strong normative
justifications in the presence of the Opinionation assumption. It is also worth noting that whenever
a non-opinionated ordering % is fully represented by a set P of probability functions, %e will always
be fully represented by the conditionalized set {P (−|e)|P ∈ P}.
To illustrate how CC* allows agents to move from the kind of indifferent epistemic states ad-
vocated by CPI2 to more opinionated epistemic states as they gather new evidence, consider the
following example (due to Keynes, 1921). We are interested in the nationality of a stranger, let’s
call her ‘Sue’. We are told that Sue is definitely from one of Ireland, France or Great Britain, but
we have no evidence regarding which of these is the true country. Thus, we are indifferent over
both the maximally fine partition {F,GB, I} and the disjunctively coarsened partition {F,GB∨I}.
CPI2 requires that we should not make any comparative confidence judgements regarding the cells
of either of these partitions. Now suppose that we also have some prior information regarding the
popularity of rugby in France, Great Britain and Ireland. In particular, we know that rugby is very
popular in Ireland, more so than in either England or France. Then, despite being indifferent about
Sue’s nationality, it is natural to expect that we should judge the proposition ‘Sue is Irish and likes
rugby’ to be strictly more plausible than the propositions ‘Sue is French and likes rugby’ and ‘Sue
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is British and likes rugby’. A simple example of an ordering that satisfies all of these conditions is
the ordering that is fully represented by the set P = {P1, P2, P3}, where
0.1 = P1(F ∧R) = P1(GB ∧R) = P1(I ∧¬R), 0.15 = P1(GB ∧¬R) = P1(I ∧R), 0.4 = P1(F ∧¬R)
0.1 = P2(F ∧R) = P2(GB ∧R) = P2(I ∧¬R), 0.15 = P2(F ∧¬R) = P2(I ∧R), 0.4 = P2(GB ∧¬R)
0.1 = P3(I ∧¬R) = P3(F ∧R) = P3(GB ∧R), 0.15 = P3(F ∧¬R) = P3(GB ∧¬R), 0.4 = P3(I ∧R)
It is easy to see that relative to this ordering, F  (GB ∨ I) and F  GB,F  I,GB  I all
hold, as required by CPI2. However, the ordering also satisfies I ∧ R  F ∧ R ∼ GB ∧ R. Now
imagine that you learn that Sue does in fact like Rugby. Revising by CC* leads to the posterior







As expected, this ordering has more comparative structure than the prior ordering. I is now
ranked above F and GB, representing the fact that we’ve updated on inductive evidence that
supports the hypothesis that Sue is Irish.
Although the update procedure described here is so simple as to seem almost trivial, it is no
small point in favour of CPI2 that it can be straightforwardly integrated into a plausible inductive
logic that allows for genuine inductive learning in all the cases that one would expect. For, one of
the main criticisms of the representation of epistemic indifference as maximally imprecise credence
is that it typically renders meaningful inductive learning impossible since the prior credence of
[0, 1] is dogmatic, i.e. no matter how much inductive evidence one conditionalizes on, they will
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retain their prior imprecise credence of [0, 1] in the hypothesis under consideration (see e.g. Rinard
(2013), Joyce (2010)). If indifference is maximally imprecise credence, then agents are doomed to
remain indifferent forever, regardless of how much evidence they obtain. This problem is completely
avoided in the comparative treatment of indifference advocated here, which allows indifferent agents
to obtain more structured epistemic states as they gather evidence about the world.
At this stage, it is worth pausing to preempt a possible reply that could be forwarded by
advocates of the imprecise approach to indifference.12 To illustrate the reply, consider the following
example, due to Rinard (2013). You are presented with an urn. You know a-priori that the urn
either contains only green marbles (H1), or contains marbles of multiple colours, only 110th of which
are green (H2). Assuming you have no further evidence, you are indifferent between H1 and H2.
Suppose that you then go on to draw a random marble from the urn, which turns out to be green.
This should increase your confidence in H1, as should each subsequent drawing of a green marble (up
until the point at which you draw a non-green marble). The problem with the imprecise approach to
indifference is that if we represent your prior indifference regarding H1 by assigning H1 the imprecise
prior credence [0, 1] and then conditionalise on the proposition E = ‘a green marble is drawn’ to
model your response to the subsequent evidence, your credence in H1 will remain fixed at [0, 1].
13
This is implausible and unintuitive. Drawing green marbles should increase your confidence in H1
(at least in comparison to H2). The comparative approach to indifference defended here encounters
no such problem. In order to model your indifference between H1 and H2, we assume that H1 and
H2 are incomparable in your prior confidence ordering. Next, we note that the conjunction H1 ∧E
is intuitively more plausible than H2 ∧ E, i.e. that your prior confidence ordering should encode
the judgement H1 ∧ E  H2 ∧ E. Since there is no reason to regard either one of H1 or H2 as
more plausible than the other, and E is clearly more plausible under the supposition that H1 is
true than it is under the supposition that H2 is true, I take this to be a compelling assumption.
12Many thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this important objection.
13Assuming that all the credence functions in your imprecise ‘representor’ set respect the stipulated constraints that
P (E|H1) = 1 and P (E|H1) = 110 .
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We can then apply CC* to model the learning of E, and we get the desired result that H1 is above
H2 in your posterior confidence ordering. Whereas the imprecise approach implausibly represents
your credence in H1 (and H2) as being fixed across the learning experience, the comparative model
has the simple virtue that it models you as becoming more confident in H1 (in comparison to H2)
when you draw a green marble.
Here, the advocate of the imprecise approach will likely be tempted to reply that the comparative
model only solves the inductive learning problem by helping itself to extra structure in the agent’s
prior epistemic state – structure that the imprecise approach does not assume. In particular, the
comparative model assumes that your prior epistemic state encodes the judgement H1∧E  H2∧E.
This judgement is not assumed by the imprecise representation, and the advocate of the imprecise
approach may well consider its inclusion in the comparative model a kind of ‘cheating’. More
precisely, they may contend that if the imprecise representation were to be augmented with this
assumption, then it too would be able to solve the inductive learning problem. So the purported
progress made by the comparative model comes from assuming more structure in the agent’s prior
epistemic state, not from changing the way in which that state and its evolution are conceptualised.
Despite its initial plausibility, this response is ultimately unsuccessful. To see this, let’s challenge
the advocate of the imprecise approach to make good on their promise that adding the assumption
H1 ∧ E  H2 ∧ E as a constraint on the agent’s prior epistemic state is sufficient to defuse their
problem with inductive learning. The natural way to interpret this constraint in the imprecise model
is as requiring that every probability function in the agent’s ‘representor’ satisfies the constraint
P (H1∧E) > P (H2∧E).14 As it turns out, this assumption is incompatible with the assumption that
the agent’s prior credence in H1 is the full closed interval [0, 1], since it implies that every function
in the representor satisfies P (H1) >
1
10P (H2) ≥ 0. However, one can accommodate the assumption
by slightly amending the imprecise approach to indifference so that it legislates a prior imprecise
14Where an agent’s ‘representor’ is the set of probability functions that is taken to represent their epistemic state on
the imprecise model (see e.g. Joyce (2010)).
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credence of (0, 1) (as opposed to [0, 1]) in H1.
15 But as it turns out, doing so does absolutely nothing
to solve the imprecise model’s problem with inductive learning. Even when one assumes that every
function in the representor satisfies the constraint P (H1 ∧E) > P (H2 ∧E), it is still the case that
updating on E will leave the agent’s imprecise credence in H1 unchanged at the original value of
(0, 1).16 So even when the imprecise model helps itself to the crucial assumption at play in the
comparative conditionalisation model, it still entails the impossibility of even the simplest inductive
learning. This being the case, the advocate of the imprecise model clearly cannot claim that the
progress of the comparative model presented here is paid for entirely by extra assumptions about
the structure of the agent’s prior epistemic state. Even if those assumptions are integrated into the
imprecise model, inductive learning remains impossible.
6 Conclusion
To summarise, the central results of the preceding analysis are that
(i) There are two natural generalisation of the principle of indifference to the comparative setting,
and although both yield consistent advice that can be consistently applied across multiple
partitions, only CPI2 provides good advice to agents at the beginning of their epistemic lives.
(ii) In light of (i), it makes sense for those epistemologists that hope to offer advice to agents at
the beginning of their epistemic lives to adopt CPI2 as a principle of ideal rationality, which
requires that they drop the Opinionation assumption as a constraint on the epistemic states
of rational agents.
(iii) CPI2 (unlike the imprecise approach to indifference) can be straightforwardly integrated into
15This amended version of the imprecise model is also considered by i.e. Rinard (2013).
16To see this, note that Rinard’s (2013) derivation of the imprecise posterior credence in H1 does not assume anything
about the relative probabilities of the conjunctions E∧H1 and E∧H2. It relies only on the facts that (i) the prior credence
in H1 is maximally imprecise (either [0, 1] or (0, 1)), and (ii) the fact that P (E|H1) = 1 and P (E|H2) = 110 , for every
function P in the representor.
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a plausible inductive logic that directly generalises Bayesian conditionalisation to the non-
opinionated setting.
As Norton writes,
In one ideal, a logic of induction would provide us with a belief state representing total
ignorance that would evolve towards different belief states as new evidence is learned.
That the Bayesian system cannot be such a logic follows from well-known, elementary
considerations. (Norton, 2008: 45)
Here, I have shown that an inductive logic articulated in terms of non-opinionated confidence
orderings can identify a unique and intuitively rational state of total ignorance that can evolve (in
a plausible way) towards different belief states as evidence is learned. Norton’s ideal is attainable.
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